Ready… Set… Go…
Personally, I have been bullish on gold prices ever since the Bank of England announced that it would sell most of its remaining gold, in the spring of 1999. One reason is that while the announcement sent gold prices down to the $250 handle, the sell off wasn't panicky, in nature. There was volume, but it wasn't a long liquidation. There weren't enough (gold) bulls around even then for the announcement to set off a panic.

It was more like the very last gasp of air that a dead bull might snort, just before he keeled over at the hands of his bullfighter…

10 year gold prices:BOE announcement	2 year gold prices:Nine month wedge?

Within five months, in any case, we were ready to discover why the Bank of England chose to slam the gold market… the major European banks had already sold or leased too much of their gold, and had finally agreed to stop the risky practice by signing the now historic Washington Agreement at month end, September 1999. Though the agreement was downplayed for its significance, perhaps it was necessary if only because the banks did not trust each other to keep to a verbal agreement (maybe even having already failed at that). Is that an idle thought?

Anyhow, with the benefit of hindsight, may we propose that it was helpful to the European banks (the signatories) for the Bank of England to stand on top of the corpse and squeeze every last ounce of life out of it (the market) first? This way, the reversal could take place from a lower price level, allowing two obvious advantages: first it would soften the net financial punishment that the market was ready to deliver in October - upon hearing of the agreement - and second, not unrelated, it would allow the European banks some time to prepare and cull their portfolios a little. In our opinion, this basic scenario is far too plausible to dismiss.

Consequently, maybe it is "not" all that ironic that lurking in the background recently has been the rumor of news that the Bank of England is short physical gold supply with which to settle on its post auction delivery notices...

The view has been offered (by many blue chip analysts…) that the psychological impact of the news that a prestigious central bank cared nothing for its gold holdings, at the time, vastly outweighed the potential market impact of the relatively small amount of gold it held and planned to sell, were it done quietly. But the Bank dismisses this key point as misguided criticism, proposing rather that they broadcast their intentions precisely because they did not want to scare the market. Huh?

You can say that again…
Anyhow, nothing ever happens unless there is a reason for it, right? Of course, we have no proof. We haven't the resources to obtain it. But we can assure you that there are very few speculators or investors who have any more than half the truth at any given point in time… maybe even less than that today.

The reality is that the Bank of England's move was out of place and out of character. It did not reconcile with the view that the European banks shared about gold officially, and it stood entirely against the American position on gold. Folks, this is not conspiracy, it is strategy. We cannot expect that if there exists a potential systemic risk in capital markets large enough that it could crush the global banking system, were it to crystallize, that politicians would tell us all about it. It just does not stand to reason.

More to the point here, adopting our view, it suddenly becomes easy to explain the rise in lease rates prior to the signing of the Washington Agreement, which seemed to puzzle the esteemed Dr. Jessica Cross in her report on the gold derivatives crisis, one year later.

Right, here we go then… those bankers in the know spent the summer unwinding some of their more perilously speculative positions. Who wouldn't? Perhaps, some of the smarter ones had also decided to hoard some physical gold supply, without detection, and maybe even bid for it at the Bank of England's own gold auctions throughout that summer. Ok, if not, how else does one explain the rise in lease rates?

Traders have been trained to anticipate large bullion sales on the rising lease rates. One reason is that it has been traditionally customary for a borrower to sell the gold right away if it was borrowed as a source of financing. The other reason is that when a central bank would sell its gold, it would draw it from the leasing pool to do it.

Yet neither occurred. Rather, there was a nearly obvious accumulation on the charts, at the $250 handle. Well then, somebody must have been accumulating physical gold supply. I suppose it could have been anyone, but consider that such a move might enable the said bankers to contain the post Washington Agreement gold market by supplying the lending pool in order to hold lease rates down and persuade us that there is plenty of supply. Sound familiar?

Yet that conclusion is way too controversial to make about her own clients and business associates, and evidently further removed from reality than the idea, proposed by Cross, that the higher lease rates were deliberated by said bankers to generate a little more profit for themselves. Hah! No kidding, that kind of guessing is allowed because it pleases the Queen that her bankers seek to profit in the name of capitalism. The greater insidious truth is that they do it at the expense of capitalism. The critic of our argument might suggest that the lending pool is far too large to lend itself (no pun intended there) to manipulation with such a small quantity of physical gold as could be bought without detection in five months. This critic should read on…

Contango-i-tis
How important are lease rates anyway? According to Dr. Cross, writing for the World Gold Council on the subject of gold derivatives and lending, "the widespread use of derivatives has generated a growing need for lent gold and the concept of participating in the leasing market has been actively marketed (?) to the official sector by the commercial banks."

Since the widespread use of derivatives has grown ever wider since the Washington Agreement was signed, lending markets must have become ever more crucial to the life blood of the contemporary banking system, and lease rates ever more indicative, of something.

But what lending market? According to Jessica Cross, again, "The extent to which the Washington Agreement has effectively sterilized a very large proportion of potential new lending is all too apparent… Should this be the case, the total potential liquidity, post the Washington Agreement, now stands at between 560 and 1000 tons. This compares with figures of over 6000 to over 9000 tons prior to the announcement."

In other words, the regular flow of gold into the lending pool has withered by almost 90%, as a result of the agreement. Well… if this tap has been all but shut off, shouldn't lease rates have risen after the Washington Agreement? Maybe that is what is happening right now. The delayed reaction may be the consequence of two things: First, demand from traditional gold borrowers undoubtedly declined by roughly the same quantity as the new supply, after witnessing what could happen to entire companies who owed the volatile metal. Second, whatever borrowers remained, largely rolled their borrowings right up the maturity contango… meaning that they extended their maturities beyond one year, for a little temporary safety. Another observation made by the Doctor (PhD) in her own report… quoting anonymous banking sources of course.

So if borrowers are borrowing longer term now than one year, that alone probably imparts a slight net drain on the availability of short-term physical gold supply. Moreover, if the currency volatility continues, duh, as if the international currency regime would all of a sudden become stable, then it is increasingly unlikely that the smaller players, like Turkey or India, will be all too willing to join loyal Kuwait in lending their official gold reserves to the hungry tentacles of a giant Fiat Octopus. And if the commercial banks continue to increase their net derivatives exposures then they will be, according to Ms. Cross, generating a growing "need" for lent gold.

So unless Japan or the United Sates enter the picture, there really isn't much of a lease market… and therefore, the published lease rates, especially under one year, have been largely containable, until now perhaps. Since Japan has the lowest proportion of their foreign exchange reserves, among its senior economic peers, vested in gold and since China is planning to become an influential gold trader in the nearby future, it is unlikely to expect Japan on the offer any time soon. If it does, it will be at its own monetary peril, but we believe that the Japanese are increasingly uninterested in supporting dollar policy as an international standard.

Finally, I cannot imagine anything quite so bullish as the American government approving the sale or lease of its own gold. What would be bearish for gold in the short run is for US bullion banks to successfully market the concept of leasing gold to influential Japanese authorities… an unlikely monetary coup for our dollar governors.

But let's consider the bullish case. Maybe there is some truth to this rumor about the Bank of England's supply shortfall. Even as far as a month ago, we began to hear questions like, what if the BOE were to repeal its gold auctions? Well, if that is true, then combined with the other pressure cookers in the lease contango and dollar-denominated capital markets, we are perhaps only seeing the beginning of an enormous supply shortfall in the gold business… especially if investment demand comes back!

And maybe the idea that the Washington Agreement effectively shut down the leasing pool in the same way and maybe for the same reason that the London Gold Pool was shut down in 1969 will be valid. If so, its symbolic significance cannot be understated.

Edmond J. Bugos
Editor - The Goldenbar Report
http://www.goldenbar.com

March 8, 2001