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Storm Tactics: DEFENSE
Defense
in Hibernation
The
Cold War was over in 1989. The Gulf War was won in 1991. There were no
major military threats on the horizon. The Peace Dividend was at hand.
It was time to downsize the nation’s military, which had been designed
to fight and win the Cold War. America was confident that there were no
more foes to be vanquished. Like the British before us, we would
retrench. As a result of victory on the diplomatic front and the
battlefield, U.S. military thinking began to change. The Doctrine of
Containment designed to deter Soviet aggression was no longer needed.
The Cold War did not end in a decisive battle. There was no Waterloo or
formal surrender. There were no peace treaties to signal its end, but it
resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The August 1991 coup in
the Crimea failed and ended with declarations by various states, leading
to the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
For
all of the dangers posed by the Cold War, the bi-polar world of two
superpowers kept aggression in check. Each power policed its own sphere
of influence. The U.S. and the Soviet Union had dampened Arab-Israeli
wars, kept the Balkans in line, and China passive. Now with the demise
of the Soviet Union, American policy leaders thought it was time to
relax our guard, thinking any immediate threats would be minor and could
be contained. The size, power, and invincibility of America’s military
displayed during the Gulf War were terrifying. No one would dare
challenge us.
Shifting Budget
Gears
With
an economy in recession, large budget deficits and a growing national
debt, Washington policymakers felt it was time to cut the defense
budget. The military became the victim of its own success. In fact, many
on the left mistakenly blamed our large deficits on the Reagan military
buildup. With the Soviet threat removed, politicians minimized the
dangers of regional conflicts and the type of force structure needed to
contain them. Two camps emerged in Washington on the future size, role
and strategy for the U.S. military. On one side were Les Aspen and Sam
Nunn. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Under Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz and General Colin Powell led the other side.
The 90’s Base
Force Concept
The
Cheney-Powell Camp designed the concept of the “Base Force.”
It was designed to meet four strategic objectives and would
consist of four major packages. The Atlantic Force (largest) was
designed to deal with Europe and Southwest Asia. The Pacific Force would
deal with Japan and Korea. A third force would control our nuclear
arsenal. The final package would be made up of a highly mobile Rapid
Deployment Force. It was well thought out and designed to deal with any
threats in an uncertain world.
The
Base Force concept wasn’t perceived well on Capital Hill. Since it was
impossible to predict who America’s enemies would be, it lacked a
ready villain. Without a
ready villain, the left saw the Base Force as being unnecessary and too
large. They attacked its strategic premises. Whereas the Cheney-Powel
Camp saw the armed forces playing an active and integral role in shaping
foreign policy, the Aspen-Nunn Camp saw the U.S. military as global cops.
Cheney argued for a strong enough force to remain engaged in the world
and to repel would-be aggressors. The Cheney plan looked well into the
future. It was impressive strategic thinking for its time. It reflected
the Bush administration’s understanding of geopolitics and the force
necessary to back foreign policy. The Aspen plan looked only at the
present.
The
Bush Administration won the initial debate. The Base Force became the
blueprint for the post-Cold War defense reductions. The military began
to redefine its force structure and strategy. Unfortunately, the Base
Force wasn’t given enough time. It was abandoned and replaced by the
Aspen plan when Bush lost the Presidency. Les Aspen became President
Clinton’s Secretary of Defense. His plan became the blueprint for
subsequent reductions of our military forces.
Eight Years of
Neglect
The
new president had no interest or understanding of foreign affairs or
military strategy. His administration pursued a policy of acting as the
world’s global cop, relying on the United Nations for direction. The
U.S. military became the UN’s 9-1-1. Missions multiplied in number
from Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, to Kosovo. While mission creep
expanded, the Clinton Administration pursued aggressive reductions in
America’s force structure. Research and development to keep our
technological edge was gutted. The concept of missile defense was
abandoned. And our military infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate.
As a result of the cutbacks, America’s defense industry contracted and
consolidated.
Upon
assuming office, President Clinton proposed his first budget in 1993. It
recommended cutting defense outlays by $112 billion on a nominal basis
during FY 1994-1998. The figures below illustrate the extent of the
cutbacks. The U.S. military shrank by more than 48% compared to its
position at the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, with a much
larger force, the U.S. military engaged in 16 small-scale operations.
Between 1990 and 1997 we engaged in 45 such missions. Like the British
government at the end of World War I, there has been a clear mismatch
between foreign policy and the means to implement it. Today, our
military is stretched to the limits.
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U.S. Force Elimination
(Clinton Administration)
-
10
Army Divisions (1 million troops)
-
20
Air Force/Navy Wings (2,000 aircraft)
-
4
Aircraft Carriers (12 = 10)
-
121
Surface Ships/Attack Submarines
-
232
Strategic Bombers
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13
Ballistic Subs (2,114 warheads)
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500
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (1,950 warheads)
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Military
Cutbacks
in the Nineties
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Where We Are Today
Today
the U.S. military force structure is running out of its useful life. Much
of the present force was inherited from the Cold War. It is aging and
breaking down. Equipment has a finite life span and the cost to maintain
aging equipment increases each year. The repairs, breakdowns, and
maintenance tempo has increased by over-extended missions. Maintenance
requirements are growing faster than maintenance budgets. It has been
well over two decades since we have undertaken a procurement
modernization cycle. We are now rapidly approaching a time period where
we will no longer have the force capabilities to carry out foreign
policy.
Recently
General Shelton commented that the current state of American readiness
has declined. The following conditions reflect the decline of our
fighting force over the last decade:
-
The U.S. Army is running out of bullets. There is a worldwide
shortage of 9mm ammunition.
-
Military departments are experiencing higher wear and tear, cost
of maintenance escalating.
-
Congress changed priorities in budget that altered delicate
balance of the force.
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Recruitment and retention rates continue to
decline.
-
Ten Army combat divisions do not have a full complement of
officers, tankers and gunners.
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The Air Force lacks 700 pilots to man its planes.
With $1 trillion in assets accounting systems are breaking down.
The Defense Department can’t keep track of assets.
In
the words of former General Larry Skippy,
“History tells us a war is in our future.” The Kagan’s warn in their book, While America Sleeps, that America is in danger… We are now in an
interwar period. It is up to
us to determine how long it will last and how will it will end.
As
the map below indicates, there are a variety of regional conflicts around the
globe. They range from major conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle
East to the South China Seas. On March 6th China
announced the largest increase to its defense budget in two decades.
China’s leadership justified the expenditures citing that conflict
with the U.S. over Taiwan was inevitable. They also issued a warning that
selling weapons to Taiwan would carry grave consequences for America.
The following day, U.S.-led NATO troops advanced against Albanian rebels
to contain the Kosovo conflict from spreading to neighboring Macedonia.
Currently there are four carrier battle groups deployed near the Middle
East and the Pacific. None of which are currently protecting our shores.
Remarkably, these events do not make front-page headlines.
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Wars
and Rumors of Wars
The following table depicts what Richard Maybury calls
"Cataclysm in Chaostan." Source: U.S. & World Early
Warning Report for Investors www.chaostan.com |
 |
| Non-Religious
Wars |
Burma,
Chad, Eritea, Ethiopia, Guniea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Laos, Liberia, Nepal, Senegal, Solomon Is., Somalia, Sudan,
Turkey |
| Religious
Wars |
Afghanistan,
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, China, Georgia, Indonesia,
Iraq, Israel, India, Kirgizstan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzebekistan |
| Piracy |
Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand |
| Runaway
Banditry |
Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central Af. Rep., Chechnya,
China, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kosovo, Laos,
Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Thailand, Yemen |
| Near
Wars |
Albania,
Bosnia, Chechnya, China, Corsica, Croatia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt,
Iran, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Kuwait, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, North Korea, Philippines, South Korea,
Spratly Islands, Taiwan, West. Sahara |
History
teaches us that weakness encourages aggression. Our current military
weakness and lack of a coherent foreign policy has served to encourage
the development of hostile states. Weapons of mass destruction
proliferate and rogue nations multiply while strategic alliances formed
against us continue to grow. The message we have sent would-be
aggressors is one of neglect. The result is the current conflicts over
the last eight years have multiplied: Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Iraq, North Korea and now, an emerging and more threatening
China.
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Missile
Arsenals of The World
Source:
Clinton's Legacy: The Dangerous Decade, A Special Report by
the Center of Security Policy and
the Blanchard Economic
Research Unit www.blanchardonline.com
|
Czech
Rep. &
Slovakia |
SS-21,
SS-23, Frog-7 |
| Hungary |
Frog-7 |
| Poland |
Scud
B, Frog-7, SS-21 |
| Romania |
Scud
B, Frog-7 |
| Bulgaria |
Scud
B, Frog-7, SS-23 |
| Syria |
Scud
B, SS-21, Frog-7, Scud B |
| China |
CSS-3,
CSS-4, CSS-5, CSS-8, M-9, M11,
CSS-N-3 |
| FSU
Republic |
SS-21,
Scud B, IICBMs-Controlled by
Russia, SLBMS-Russia Only |
| North
Korea |
Scuf
B, Scud C, Frog-7, No-Dong,
Taepo Dong I/II |
| South
Korea |
NHK-I,
NHK-II, NHK-A, Scud B |
| Afghanistan |
Scud
B, Frog-7 |
| Vietnam |
Scud
B |
| India |
Prithvi,
Agni |
| Pakistan |
Hatf
1, Hatf 2, Hatf 3 |
| Iran
Shahab |
Scud
B, Scud-C, CSS-8, Frog-7 |
| UAE |
Scud
B |
| Yemen |
Scud
B, SS-21, Mod 2, Frog-7 |
| Saudi
Arabia |
CSS-2 |
| Iraq |
CSS-2,
Al Hussein, Frog-7 |
| Israel |
Lance,
Jericho I, Jericho II |
| Egypt |
Scud
B, Frog-7 |
| Libya |
Scud-B,
Frog-7 |
Many
on the left argue against a strong defense, preferring diplomacy. Lest
we forget the appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain, the cost of
deterring war is infinitely cheaper than fighting one. America’s
status as the last remaining superpower requires being engaged in the
world. Effective foreign policy requires a strong military force to back
it. Contrary to popular opinion, the world has become a far more
dangerous place since the end of the Cold War.
We are now rapidly running out of time to repair the damage
done by a decade of neglect. If we are to remain engaged in the world,
if we are to deter would-be aggressors and provide for our own defense,
drastic actions need to be taken. Should we fail in this effort, we may
find ourselves in the same position as Great Britain during the late
1920’s and the 1930’s. There are no Hitlers and Mussolinis on the
horizon, but there are plenty of madmen hankering for great things. As
we become weaker, we become more vulnerable. We may find ourselves
engaged on the battlefield by events not of our own choosing.
Present-Day Defense Proposals
Recognizing the foreign policy mess it has inherited, the new
Bush Administration has initiated a thorough review of the nation’s
military by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. An assessment will be
made, a strategy will be formulated, and a budget will be drawn to match
that strategy. But as Daniel Goure and Jeffrey Ranney argue in their
book, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium, we
are likely to underestimate the cost of providing for our national
security. They believe that President Bush and the 107th
Congress represent one of the last opportunities for defining the
military forces and capabilities for U.S. defense in the next decade.
Procurement
A massive procurement program will be needed in order to
repair and maintain our technological lead. On February 13, the
President outlined a new strategic vision. Bush defined military power
not by size but by mobility and swiftness. The Bush Administration will
attempt to leapfrog existing technologies and challenge the status quo.
The President defined the new military saying, “On land, our heavy
forces will be lighter and more lethal. Airpower will be able to strike
across the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and
unmanned systems. Naval forces…will focus on network centric warfare
that connects information and weapons in new ways.”
Increased
Budget
Not since Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency has such a
reformulation of U.S. military strategy been undertaken. Bush will cut
many major weapon systems inherited from the Cold War to make way for
the high tech wars of the future. A missile defense system will be
deployed. New lethal technologies will be developed and new weapon
systems will be utilized. The result will be an increased defense
budget.
Political Inroads
The Bush team has the experience and the expertise to rebuild
America’s declining military. It will take tremendous political skills
to carry it through. At the moment the general public believes we live
in a peaceful world. There are no villains to focus our attention on and
build our resolve. The mainstream media naively believes in appeasement
and that diplomacy will make the world more peaceful and keep America
safe.
But as the Kagan’s warn in While America Sleeps, it
may already be too late. The cost of repairing the military will be
staggering. America has begun to allow the world stage to slip through
its hands. Coalitions and alliances have broken up or are drifting
apart. The public doesn’t understand the risk. So if a recession
develops, they may not be willing to pay the cost. Just as Great Britain
withdrew from its responsibilities after World War I to tend to its own
domestic affairs, America has followed similar pursuits. Wars are
inevitable. They are more constant than peace. The next one will be more
brutal. In the age of missiles, the oceans no longer separate us from the
battlefield.
April 2, 2001
© 2001 James J. Puplava
www.financialsense.com
jpuplava@financialsense.com
(858) 486-3939 Tel (858) 486-8934 Fax
12255 Parkway Centre Drive
Poway, CA 92064
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